FINAL
DRAFT
The
Ever-Spiraling Crisis
in Unauthorized Technology
Transfer
Art Madsen,
M.Ed.
As technology advances
it invades, for better or for worse, not only the private homes and small
businesses of America and the Global Community, but impacts the corporate
environment composed of large domestic industries and multinational
conglomerates. Similarly, as the
complexity of business transactions becomes even more challenging, competitive
and interwoven, a resurgence of illicit and frequently criminal activities has
developed, involving the use of technology, both old and new.
After briefly reviewing
the history of this phenomenon, which originated in the early days of the
American Nation, and dates much farther back into European and Asian commerce
and industry, this report will examine the nature, scope and impact of
industrial espionage within the context of American and International industry.
At the beginning of the
19th Century, the growth of American business was not always based on the most
Christian and Puritanical of principles.
Entire industries thrived on stolen technology or industrial
processes. The textile mills of
Lowell, Massachusetts, as a case in point, were founded almost exclusively on
purloined knowledge from England.
Indeed, the entire Merrimack Valley in North Central Massachusetts and
Southern New Hampshire was kept economically afloat and competitively viable on
the basis of the Cartwright Loom, which
utilized a secret process perfected ingeniously in the United
Kingdom. Through what amounts to nothing less than industrial
espionage by the standards of both this century and last, concepts, design
features and plans for the Cartwright Loom were stolen by the very man after
whom the City of Lowell was named!
Indeed, Francis Cabot Lowell, whose memory and cleverness were just a
little too good for England’s sake, exported, in 1813, specific design plans for
these looms which were adapted only slightly for large scale production in New
England of fabrics and textiles. [1] Thus American industry was off to a
flying start, and so was the blossoming field of “corporate information”, which is, in
the opinion of some authors, a polite euphemism for “competitive intelligence,”
or more seriously, “industrial espionage.”
With due respect to
America, this country was not alone. Documents dating back to the ancient days
of the silk trade in China also attest to the intelligence-gathering
capabilities of competing traders, and, in more recent times, the Chinese have
been particularly active in this area, as in the case of Bin Wu who became
embroiled in a major industrial-military espionage case in 1991.[2]
Generally speaking,
specialists in this field make a fine distinction between the two terms, namely
“corporate information” and “competitive intelligence.”[3] They feel that “corporate information”
consists of fairly isolated factual data that has not been analyzed and
interpreted. Whereas, “competitive
intelligence” is material that has been sifted, grouped, categorized and
analyzed, with a view toward enhancing competitive position in a given
market. When this knowledge
is fully processed it is sometimes converted into competitive intelligence
systems or models. These two concepts fall well within the boundaries of the law
and have been practiced aggressively in American industry without judicial
consequences. But, in the case of
Mr. Lowell, for example, the limits were exceeded because he exported, without
the Crown’s authorization, specific plans and processes that had been protected
by British industrial secrecy legislation.
In fact, the Lowell case, and that of Mr. Wu in the 1990s, fall into a
distinctly different classification which forms the real subject of this report:
industrial espionage.
Although gaining
information from data bases, trash receptacles, privately circulated memoranda,
and conversation at loose-lipped three Martini luncheons falls into a
permissible category, industrial espionage does not. Espionage within and among corporations
is occurring with increasing frequency and measures are being taken to protect
against it.[4] These measures fall into a special
strategic category known as counter-intelligence, representing an entire field
in itself. However, both the
illicit gathering of intelligence and the defense systems against it involve the
highest technological expertise available and consume a great deal of corporate
and governmental time on both sides of the question. Industrial espionage falls into a
disturbingly shady area where people assume identities, play roles and move
about in patterns that can only be regarded as dramatic and invasive. The stakes are quite high because
competition has become so brutal, high-pressured, and confrontational that major industries -- although they may initially have pure motives --
often find themselves drawn into
doubtful practices simply to stay ahead of their competitor or to maintain
market share.
The U.S. Government has
considered the threat of unfriendly espionage in business and industry so
serious that it has authorized and mandated preparation of an annual report
documenting the extent and nature of sub-rosa practices.[5] Perhaps because the industrial
infrastructure of the United States was, in part, founded centuries ago on
material obtained surreptitiously, and this activity has continued unabated both
domestically and internationally,
the U.S. Government is well aware, not only of how easy it is to obtain
secret information, but of the
extreme danger of on-going data collection and industrial espionage as they are
practiced in the United States today, particularly in defense-related and
high-tech industries.
With government and
industry officials committed to protecting the vital interests of the nation and
its economy, serious study of the three identified levels[6]
of intrusive tactics has been conducted. Naturally, investigative efforts are
focused on the most serious of these three: unlawful espionage activities. So prevalent have these activities
become that a Harvard study demonstrated that 27% of firms surveyed had
discovered serious incursions into secret, patented or off-limits processes or
documents.[7]
Additionally, over
twenty years ago, Harvard published scholarly material on effective
methodologies used in assessing both political and espionage risk in given
industrial settings.[8] These studies, conducted some time ago,
may now be outdated as the incidence of covert crime within corporations
continues to escalate.
Many of these
publications, whether they consist of Harvard-generated material, managerial
textbooks, academic journals, or
government sources, make mention of industrial espionage methods and
strategies which include the standard array one might expect, plus desperate
tactics verging on blackmail, extortion and, not least of all, implied or actual
theft.[9] These methods would simply not be used
unless they were, on balance, successful in obtaining the desired information.
Apart from informal
written studies dealing with counter-espionage techniques, this clandestine
struggle, a contemporary fact-of-life throughout the world, is documented at
length in texts such as the referenced Heims volume.
The first line of
defense against such industrial spying is to restrict circulation of documents
within the firm, as well as access to databases. Then, of course, restricting physical
access to research labs and secured sectors of industrial complexes can be
tried. Nonetheless, all of this,
and much more, is merely child’s play for the experienced “sleeper” or potential
“traitor”. He or she finds it easy
to penetrate security precautions and obstacles.
Because 70% of
Americans hired to work on U.S. Projects overseas fail to complete their
employment contracts[10],
foreign nationals are being hired with predictable results: a proliferation of
leaks, divided loyalties, covert operations, corruption and a
consequential
financial loss to the
U.S. industrial sector amounting to billions of dollars.
As the sophistication
of intelligence operations improves, and as corporations struggle to maintain an
edge (whether they engage in these practices and/or strive to protect against
them), the playing field becomes
muddied and the stakes rise inexorably.
The rules of the game
become blurred, and the initial aura of mere “impropriety” gives way to
undercover, surreptitious conduct aimed at sheer survival of the company in an
increasingly unethical climate.
There are relatively few firms that have completely escaped this
scenario. Many attempt valiantly to
ward off the invasiveness of unscrupulous employees who will compromise their
personal honor and that of their firms, sometimes without a second thought. Since human behavior seems to be at the
root of this conduct, providing strong “disincentives” might prove a possible
solution, but the penalties will have to be stiff. Indeed, serious thought in
the field of counter-intelligence is being given to increasing the price such
“practitioners” must pay should they transgress basic ethical practice.
The readings and
articles surveyed in preparing this analysis seem to point toward the ever-spiraling growth of industrial
espionage and many authors document either the corporate sector’s increasing
participation in such practices, or protection against them.
References
Bottom, N.R., Gallati,
R.J. Industrial Espionage:
Intelligence Techniques and
Countermeasures, Butterworth Publishers, Boston,
1984.
Fialka J. War by Other Means: Economic
Espionage in America, W.W. Norton and Company, New York,
1997.
Heims, P.A. Countering Industrial Espionage,
20th Century Security Education, Ltd., Surrey, England,
1982.
Kahaner, L.
Competitive Intelligence, Simon & Schuster, New York,
N.Y.,1996.
Roukis, G.S., Conway,
H., Charnov, B.H. Global Corporate Intelligence, Quorum Books, New York,
N.Y. 1990.
Rummel, R. And Heenan,
D. “How Multinationals Analyze Political Risk”, Harvard Business Review,
56:1, Jan-Feb 1978, 67-76.
....................... Annual Report to Congress on Economic
Collection and Industrial Espionage, National Counter-Intelligence Center,
NACIC, Washington, D.C., July 1995.
(http://www.fas.org/sgp/othergov/indust.html)
[1] Fialka J. War by Other Means: Economic
Espionage in America, W.W. Norton and Company, New York, 1997,
3-4.
[2] Fialka, J., op cit., 21.
[3] Kahaner, L. Competitive
Intelligence, Simon & Schuster, New York, N.Y.,1996, 20.
[4] Bottom, N.R., Gallati,
R.J. Industrial Espionage:
Intelligence Techniques and
Countermeasures, Butterworth Publishers, Boston, 1984,
passim.
[5] ....................... Annual Report to Congress on Economic
Collection and Industrial Espionage, National Counter-Intelligence Center,
NACIC, Washington, D.C., July
1995.
(http://www.fas.org/sgp/othergov/indust.html)
[6] Information & data
collection, competitive intelligence and industrial espionage.
[7]Heims, P.A. Countering Industrial Espionage,
20th Century Security Education, Ltd., Surrey, England, 1982, 83.
[8] Rummel, R. and Heenan, D.
“How Multinationals Analyze Political Risk”, Harvard Business Review,
56:1, Jan-Feb 1978,
passim.
[9] Bottom, N.R. et al.,
op.cit., 149.
[10] Roukis, G.S., Conway, H.,
Charnov, B.H. Global Corporate Intelligence, Quorum Books, New York, N.Y.
1990.