Below is the 'cut & paste' version of the Memorandum you requested. The material on Sudanese Government officials, parties, policies and so forth came from (1) our conversation, (2) the Net, and (3) G. Norman Anderson's SUDAN IN CRISIS: THE FAILURE OF DEMOCRACY, University Press of Florida, Miami, 1999, DT 157.673.A531999. Anderson was former US Ambassador to Khartoum, and is quite an authority on the politics of The Sudan, including the South.
September 20, 1999
Since May of 1983 when former President Numayri dissolved the Southern Regional Government and divided the South into three parts in order to reduce the power of the Dinka, factionalism among tribal groupings has continued to plague our Region. This has weakened our collective position in relation to the North and has led to great suffering among our people. In recent years there have been blatantly disloyal Equatorians, such as Joseph Lagu, who have betrayed the interests of the South in order to attempt weakening the position of the Dinka.
The North, as we are well aware, has consistently sought to intensify tribal divisions in our Region and has frequently plotted to undermine the primacy of the Dinka. There was an attempt at democratic rule under the Sadiq government, but this has clearly deteriorated, since the 1989 coup, under the increasingly ruthless dictatorship of Lieutenant General Umar Hasan Ahmad al-Bashir. His Prime Minister, bearing the title "First Vice President", is Ali Uthman Muhammad Taha. And Umar's Second Vice President, or Deputy Prime Minister, (in charge of the Security Police) is currently Major General George Kongor Arop.
We are all disturbed by the campaign of biological warfare, conducted by these leaders in Khartoum, against our people for religious, economic, territorial and ethnic reasons. In addition to the periodic aerial dissemination of toxins over our tribal villages and lands, more than $2.5 Million per day is being spent by Khartoum, with financial assistance from sympathetic Islamic Governments, to physically suppress the Dinka in the South and to secure oil production facilities, revenues from which are bolstering the Khartoum regime, and lining the pockets of oil companies in Canada, Malaysia and Mainland China.
These are the dynamics of which we are all currently cognizant. In my efforts to coordinate an E-Mail Server-List of Dinka Sudanese in exile, I have found it necessary to participate in two distinct groups of exiled Sudanese.
The first of these contains non-Dinka emigrés, probably informants working on behalf of Khartoum and those who are actively and openly opposed to Dinka interests in territory traditionally considered ours. It is important to note that the Dinka have willingly shared traditional territory with many ethnic groups, except our notorious opponents the Arab Nomadic Rizayqat group. However, in spite of our relative openness toward many smaller tribes, several of them have actively opposed our dominance by joining with the forces of Khartoum, or by frustrating efforts at autonomy in the South. Many of you will recall, for example, that dissention erupted in August of 1991 when smaller tribes joined with Anya Nya 2 to capture more than 25% of SPLA-occupied territory. To be honest, I am afraid that the same type of counterproductive, even dangerous divisiveness is erupting on my first E-Mail Server List.
This Memorandum is, of course, being sent only to my Second E-Mail Server List, comprised of approximately 15 trustworthy Sudanese in exile of Dinka ethnicity. With you, I wish to speak frankly and openly in an effort to brain-storm strategies and solutions to the many problems confronting our people, notably the genocidal policy of aerial spraying of bio-toxins onto our cities, villages and farms.
I have recently been in touch with high-echelon officials in Washington, DC concerning the seriousness of the current anti-Dinka campaign waged by Khartoum; however, I am not at liberty via electronic means to provide you with more details at the present time. It is extremely important, however, that all of you realize that the First E-Mail Server List to which I refer is heavily infiltrated with individuals motivated to inflict harm on the cause of our people, which is (ultimately) no less than independence from Khartoum and control of our own economic assets. Some of you may wish to see reestablishment of the Southern Regional Government, yet I wish to emphasize that this concept (I need not remind most of you) is no longer workable as long as Lt. General Umar remains in power in Khartoum. He is steadfastly bent on fulfilling the Islamic expansionist policies of those whom he directly or indirectly serves.
However, I wish to give many of you the gift of "hope" for our future. As developments occur in Washington, DC, I will do my best to contact each of you in some secure way to inform you of the roles and responsibilities we must assume, ... and the timing and execution of those roles and responsibilities.
In the interim, let us engage in constructive dialogue, marginalizing and ignoring those (on the First Server-List) who wish us harm. Our Professor in Miami and myself are here to reply to your enquiries and respond to your concerns.
With fervent fraternal greetings of solidarity and commitment,
Generally speaking, although certain members of the Dinka tribe have been contributing to SPLA funds, other ethnic groupings from Southern Sudan seem less enthusiastic in their support.
The Dinka tribe is numerically dominant in this region. Indeed, 85 percent of liberation fighters who have perished in combat have been Dinkas. It stands to reason that certain officials, both administrative and military will be chosen from among members of the Dinka tribe. This practice, however, does not necessarily discriminate against minoritarian tribal members who have, on many occasions, demonstrated their loyalty to SPLA values and objectives.
United States Army Intelligence operatives in Southern Sudan, or here in the United States, can readily confirm the foregoing. They are aware of the demographics and interactive dynamics of operations currently underway.
Dr. Onek, a member of a minoritarian tribe in the region, has organized a well-equipped training camp, featuring an active military contingent, and is the leader of this sub-grouping which plans to undermine the SPLA movement. He is a disruptive force attempting to influence, against the Dinka, a growing number of his tribe's intellectuals and seems to be succeeding to a limited degree. He has reportedly planted clandestine informants, known as "moles", within the SPLA's ranks to gain strategic information useful in promoting his objectives which are linked with those of Khartoum.
He seems bent on leading the Dinka needlessly into confrontation with Khartoum's troops, especially in battles where the Dinka are clearly out-gunned. This leads observers to conclude that Dr. Onek is intentionally coordinating these pre-staged confrontations with Khartoum.
Given Dr. Onek's obvious bias in these matters, readers of his postings, and those of his followers, will easily understand why he is distorting the truth.
I would like to take this opportunity to respond to you and to my SSNET colleagues who have demonstrated such an enthusiastic interest in my comments.
My previous statements in favor of democracy and justice have been attacked by a number of you, who obviously have other plans for the New Sudan.
First of all, reliable sources, such as Catholic Relief Services, in addition to United Nations statistics, attest to the demographic fact that the Dinka Tribe is by far in the majority in the regions to be incorporated into the New Sudan. Here, for example, is one such site where it is stated that approximately 80% of the internally displaced people are of the Bor Dinka tribe. My previously cited figures fall into this range of magnitude. [http://www.catholicrelief.org/where/sudan/eop.cfm]
What I am simply promoting here is equality of all tribes, but numerical representation on governing bodies, on the basis of tribal proportion in the general population. This system is democratically justified by on-site conditions and by ideological priorities. Naturally, minority tribe members, if their loyalty to the New Sudan has been demonstrated, would be granted a fair voice in the running of government and in its organizational structure.
Contrary to those of you who seem to know more about me than I know about myself, I have no personal ambitions within the New Sudan’s projected hierarchy. I simply wish to see sovereignty of our New Nation and justice for all -- inclusive of both the Dinka majority (now constituting the most heavily enslaved of all ethnic groupings and bearing the brunt of all fighting) and the minority tribes, many of whom are loyal to the cause of Independence.
I fully agree with you, Michael, that unity against Khartoum is our primary objective at this juncture. But, currently, some minority groups have been organizing against the South’s interests, notably Dr. Onek’s contingent with which we have recently dispensed. We must guard against other defecting groupings and avoid the Dinka being sandwiched in between Khartoum, on the one hand, and secret groups, among the New Sudan’s very ranks, clandestinely loyal to Khartoum on the other.
Restoration of unity among all of us is therefore imperative. And vigilance is needed to prevent break-away factions bent on dictatorial power in the future New Sudan. Once free, do we want a Bokassa, an Amin, a Mobutu, a Tombalbaye to rule us, too?
Let me point out the surprising unity among my critics in the 12 responses received so far! This clearly demonstrates that they are minority tribal “break-aways”, desirous of implementing their own agendas. My personal favorite is the guy who says openly: We certainly can’t have a representative democracy like in the United States in the New Sudan!
My friends, let us donate generously to the children, the women and the old folks who are being decimated by the on-going violence. We need broad-based unity in Our Cause and proportional donations to demonstrate support for the SPLM’s struggle, not in-fighting, jealously and counter-attacks on our all-important SSNET e-mail channel.
The CRS figures I quoted speak for themselves, as you noted. What you failed to grasp is that, given equally distributed displacement in the Southern Sudan among all tribal members, the 80% figure can be validly extrapolated to reflect the approximate percentage of Dinka in the general population. It's just a mere statistical adjustment, something certainly of which a PhD candidate, as well as astute undergraduates, should be well aware.