Dear Mark:
I apologize for not having had the time to reply thoughtfully to your letter of last Wednesday, the eleventh. I also call myself to task for having dashed off an insipid mini-treatise on the ill-conceived Hahn juxtapositioning of sacramental confession and juridical admission of guilt.
His having traced the historical development of the phenomenon of confession, in the generic sense, and his having inextricably linked its religious origins throughout the ages with legal process disturbed me, not so much due to an "intrinsically spiritual concept" having been intermingled with the judiciary, but because the Catholic notion of confession is perhaps not truly worthy of inclusion within our contemporary body of secular law, whether here on in Europe.
All good Catholic boys in knickers were taught, perhaps by implicit example, in the 1950s, that the Church was a spiritually centered community which occupied perhaps two hours a week of one's time: Mass and the weekly CCD class. Our superficial introduction to spirituality led us to believe -- perhaps naïvely -- that God was merciful, loving and kind, that the Priest was his sacredly-selected intermediary and that forgiveness was invariably forthcoming upon a heart-felt expression of contrition. We were not schooled in the treachery of Pope Alexander the Second who subjected his entourage to Trial by Fire, eliciting something more than heart-felt contrition. Nor were we told how the Church interwove throughout the centuries its definition of morality with State affairs. The "Cardinal Richelieu" image, one portraying a cloaked cleric rubbing his hands together in glee at the prospect of destroying an archrival, did not come to our attention until at least our Freshman Year at University.
Indeed, we matured slowly in the Faith, protected from its excesses until we were exposed to conflicting theological and philosophical paradigms.
The adoption of Hahn's thesis, which seems to lay the groundwork for sacramental confession assuming a secular role, by the Calvinists, Lutherans and Anglicans was a revolutionary notion that transgressed the bounds of Catholicism...and was, in fact, heretical. It wasn't so much the heresy which disturbed me, it was the volatile and unstable admixture created by the blending of the spiritual with the terrestrial.
This discussion invites us, however, to examine some of your premises and comments which fall within the scope of the nature and purpose of confession, whether in the sacramental sense, or within Hahn's juridico-religious paradigm.
A few ad lib observations:
1. My "concerns over the merits of confession": Because it has roots in the subjective interpretation of God's Law by man and has been historically abused often in the most egregious sense, I have strong reservations as to its applicability in the Modern Church. We were told that, in the absence of a priest, God's pardon would not be denied us, on condition that we request it of Him in a sincere fashion. So, I seldom seek out priests as spiritual intermediaries. I suspect that I am not alone, among fellow Catholics, in this "subtle avoidance" strategy.
2. "Which acts require absolution?" Ah, the plot thickens. God grants absolution and imposes His justice on His people. He also imposes His justice on His priests, bishops and cardinals. For what acts might God impose His justice on a Pontiff? The silence of Pius XII during the Reich?
"Absolution" assumes that guilt is present; guilt is a relative term, as we will see, and a major ploy to bend the people to the will, not of God who unconditionally forgives, but of God's intermediaries.
3. Confession as "a reflective act that creates meaning": This would seem to be a lay interpretation of the sacrament. Confession, in the Catholic sense, creates more than meaning, it guarantees reconciliation with God. Phenomenologically, meaning is a central concept. I agree with Hegel. Meaning can certainly grow out of reconciliation, generating a sense of renewal and solace within an individual who accepts the underlying notion of "cathartic" confession. Within the legal context, too, we seek an expression of "remorse" which may fulfill the purpose of, at least, attempting reconciliation with society, in this instance.
4. In-Order-To Motives and Because-Motives: Yes, the "because" concept requires a glance back at our underlying reasons for acting; whereas, the "in-order-to" concept usually precedes an act and is a primitive expression of our desires or needs. Sartre 101A. So where does this leave us? From a psychotherapeutic perspective, confession has merit as a vehicle for crystallizing our motives at the conscious level...whereupon they are absorbed sub-consciously and rethought. I have no objection to this process. I recognize that sacramental confession achieves this objective, but, according to the Church, transcends it as well. Whether you or I could accept this transcendent feature is another matter.
5. Yes, I accept the paradigm wherein these concepts, restructured slightly from your remarks, are posited:
Classical Antipodal Relationship
Means-Ends <----------------------------------->Retrospective Analysis
In-Order To <----------------------------------------------------->Because
Sin <------------------------------------------------------------>Forgiveness
Absolute<------------------------------------------------------------>Relative
Yet, this matrix is only an abstract rendering of far more complex concepts.
Sin, for example, has to be defined and is, in my estimation, on a sliding scale of relativity, and can not be strictly equated, above, as an absolute.
6. Jean Genet speaks eloquently to your thoughts in most of his writings. He was the philosopher-thief, pardoned by the President of the Republic at Sartre's request.
If I stole a loaf of German Bread from the supermarket, for example, it would not be because the "community has failed me", it would be because the Export-Import Bank of the United States and the I.M.F. are artificially propping up the intrinsically unjust world financial system (condemned by His Holiness) by using my money and yours to further enrich their financial community, while countless billions of worker-bees starve to death to support their excesses. My reluctance to support such a system would have led to my need, or desire, to deprive the bank-financed merchant of his merchandise. It's a bit more complex psychodynamically than pure Marxism, however. In fact, it approaches the ideals of the Liberation Theologists, of whom Father Drinan may have been an adherent (Dean of the Boston College Law School and a friend of my family).
7. Liberation Theology is, as you suggest, providing the tools to the disenfranchised to improve their lot. It is far more than that, however. It embraces almost the Sandinista Ideal...i.e. forcefully depriving the autocrats and oligarchists of their holdings and redistributing wealth appropriately.
Within the context of Liberation Theology, confession might have a slightly altered role: that of serving to justify what was only weeks earlier unthinkable. Again, the notion of relativity comes into play.
8. "Innocuous structural solution leading to abuse": Wonderful thought, Mark. You are beginning to see -- although you were speaking of a managerial model here -- that "structure" can be abused. I'm sure that Daniel Ortega felt that Anastasio Somoza was "structured" and did, in fact, "abuse..."
And yet you curiously suggest in your final sentence that a structured solution, coupled with individual development, might be desirable within a corporate setting. Indeed, structure is necessary in an organizational sense, but human freedom, almost to the point of "pacifistic anarchy", is what, I feel, God may have intended for us under the doctrine of Free Will.
I hope this may have been helpful to you. Perhaps I will show up at noon on Friday and be able to discuss these points in person with you.
Yours, Art
mioche@hotmail.com
